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ABSTRACT
In recent years, neural networks have been extensively deployed for computer
vision tasks, particularly visual classification problems, where new algorithms re-
ported to achieve or even surpass the human performance. Recent studies have
shown that they are all vulnerable to the attack of adversarial examples. Small
and often imperceptible perturbations to the input images are sufficient to fool the
most powerful neural networks. Advbox is a toolbox suite to not only generate
adversarial examples that fool neural networks in PaddlePaddle, PyTorch, Caffe2,
MxNet, Keras, TensorFlow, but also benchmarks the robustness of machine learn-
ing models. Compared to previous work, our platform supports black box attacks
on Machine-Learning-as-a-service, as well as more attack scenarios, such as Face
Recognition Attack, Stealth T-shirt, and DeepFake Face Detect. AdvBox is openly
available at https://github.com/advboxes/AdvBox. It now supports Python 3.
1 INTRODUCTION
Deep learning (DL) has made significant progress in a wide domain of machine learning (ML):
image classification (Krizhevsky et al., 2012; Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014; He et al., 2016), object
detection (Redmon et al., 2016; Redmon & Farhadi, 2017), speech recognition (Graves et al., 2013;
Amodei et al., 2016), language translation (Sutskever et al., 2014; Bahdanau et al., 2014), voice
synthesis Oord et al. (2016); Shen et al. (2018).
Szegedy et al. first generated small perturbations on the images for the image classification problem
and fooled state-of- the-art deep neural networks with high probability (Szegedy et al., 2013). These
misclassified samples were named as Adversarial Examples. A large number of attack algorithms
have been proposed, such as FGSM (Goodfellow et al., 2014), BIM (Kurakin et al., 2016), DeepFool
(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016), JSMA (Papernot et al., 2016b), CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017), PGD
(Madry et al., 2017a).
The scope of researchers’ attacks has also gradually extended from the field of computer vision
(Fischer et al., 2017; Xie et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019a; Jia et al., 2020) to the field of natural
language processing (Ebrahimi et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018; Gao et al., 2018; Goodman et al., 2020)
and speech (Carlini & Wagner, 2018; Qin et al., 2019; Yakura & Sakuma, 2019).
Cloud-based services offered by Amazon1, Google2, Microsoft3, Clarifai4 and other public cloud
companies have developed ML-as-a-service tools. Thus, users and companies can readily benefit
from ML applications without having to train or host their own models(Hosseini et al., 2017a). Un-
like common attacks against web applications, such as SQL injection and XSS, there are very special
attack methods for machine learning applications, e.g., Adversarial Attack. Obviously, neither pub-
lic cloud companies nor traditional security companies pay much attention to these new attacks and
defenses(Goodman & Hao, 2020; Goodman & Wei, 2019; Li et al., 2019; Goodman et al., 2019b;a;
Goodman & Hao, 2019; Goodman, 2020; Goodman et al., 2018).
1https://aws.amazon.com/cn/rekognition/
2https://cloud.google.com/vision/
3https://azure.microsoft.com
4https://clarifai.com
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In this paper, we will focus on adversarial example attack, defense and detection methods based on
our AdvBox. Our key items covered:
• The basic principles and implementation ideas.
• Adversarial example attack, defense and detection methods.
• Black box attacks on Machine-Learning-as-a-service.
• More attack scenarios, such as Face Recognition Attack, Stealth T-shirt, and Deepfake Face
Detect.
2 RELATED WORK
Currently, several attack/defense platforms have been proposed, like Cleverhans (Papernot et al.,
2016a), FoolBox (Rauber et al., 2017), ART (Nicolae et al., 2018), DEEPSEC (Ling et al., 2019),
etc. For a detailed comparison, see the Table 1.
Table 1: Comparison of different adversarial attack/defense platforms. ”
√
” means ”support”.
Cleverhans FoolBox ART DEEPSEC Our
Tensorflow(Abadi et al., 2016)
√ √ √ √
PyTorch(Paszke et al., 2019)
√ √ √ √ √
MxNet(Chen et al., 2015)
√ √ √
PaddlePaddle5
√
Adversarial Attack
√ √ √ √ √
Adversarial Defense
√ √ √ √ √
Robustness Evaluation
√ √ √ √
Adversarial Detection
√ √ √ √
Attack on ML-as-a-service
√
Actual attack scenario
√
3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
3.1 PROBLEM FORMULATION
The function of a pre-trained classification model F , e.g. an image classification or image detection
model, is mapping from input set to the label set. For a clean image example O, it is correctly
classified by F to ground truth label y ∈ Y , where Y including {1, 2, . . . , k} is a label set of k
classes. An attacker aims at adding small perturbations in O to generate adversarial example ADV ,
so that F (ADV ) 6= F (O), where D(ADV,O) < , D captures the semantic similarity between
ADV and O,  is a threshold to limit the size of perturbations. For computer vision, D usually
stands for Perturbation Measurement.
3.2 PERTURBATION MEASUREMENT
lp measures the magnitude of perturbation by p-norm distance:
‖x‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
‖xi‖p
) 1
p
(1)
l0, l2, l∞ are three commonly used lp metrics. l0 counts the number of pixels changed in the
adversarial examples; l2 measures the Euclidean distance between the adversarial example and the
original sample; l∞ denotes the maximum change for all pixels in adversarial examples.
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4 ADVBOX
4.1 OVERVIEW
Advbox is a toolbox suite not only generate adversarial examples that fool neural networks in Pad-
dlePaddle6, PyTorch(Paszke et al., 2019), Caffe27, MxNet8, Keras, TensorFlow(Abadi et al., 2016)
but also benchmarks the robustness of machine learning models.
4.2 STRUCTURE
Advbox is based on Python9 and uses object-oriented programming.
4.2.1 ATTACK CLASS
Advbox implements several popular adversarial attacks which search adversarial examples. Each at-
tack method uses a distance measure(L1, L2, etc.) to quantify the size of adversarial perturbations.
Advbox is easy to craft adversarial example as some attack methods could perform internal hyper-
parameter tuning to find the minimum perturbation. The code is implemented as advbox.attack.
4.2.2 MODEL CLASS
Advbox implements interfaces to Tensorflow(Abadi et al., 2016), PyTorch(Paszke et al., 2019),
MxNet(Chen et al., 2015), and PaddlePaddle10. Additionally, other deep learning framworks such
as TensorFlow can also be defined and employed. The module is use to compute predictions and
gradients for given inputs in a specific framework.
AdvBox also supports GraphPipe11, which shields the underlying deep learning platform. Users can
conduct black box attack on model files generated by Caffe212, CNTK13, MATLAB14 and Chainer15
platforms. The code is implemented as advbox.model.
4.2.3 ADVERSARY CLASS
Adversary contains the original object, the target and the adversarial examples. It provides the
misclassification as the criterion to accept a adversarial example. The code is implemented as
advbox.adversary.
4.3 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK
We support 6 attack algorithms which are included in adversarialbox, one of the sub-components of
AdvBox. The adversarialbox is based on FoolBox v1 Rauber et al. (2017).
• FGSM(Goodfellow et al., 2014)
• BIM(Kurakin et al., 2016)
• DeepFool(Moosavi-Dezfooli et al., 2016)
• JSMA(Papernot et al., 2016b)
• CW(Carlini & Wagner, 2017)
• PGD(Madry et al., 2017a)
6https://github.com/paddlepaddle/paddle
7https://caffe2.ai/
8http://mxnet.incubator.apache.org/
9https://www.python.org/
10https://github.com/paddlepaddle/paddle
11https://github.com/oracle/graphpipe
12https://caffe2.ai/
13https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/cognitive-toolkit/
14https://www.mathworks.com/products/deep-learning.html
15https://chainer.org/
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The code is implemented as advbox.attack. JSMA are often used as a baseline l0 attack algorithm.
CW are often used as a baseline l2 attack algorithm. FGSM and PGD are often used as a baseline
l∞ attack algorithm.
4.4 ADVERSARIAL ATTACK MITIGATION
Advbox supports 6 defense algorithms:
• Feature Squeezing(Xu et al., 2017)
• Spatial Smoothing(Xu et al., 2017)
• Label Smoothing(Xu et al., 2017)
• Gaussian Augmentation(Zantedeschi et al., 2017)
• Adversarial Training(Madry et al., 2017b)
• Thermometer Encoding(Buckman et al., 2018)
The code is implemented as advbox.defense. Adversarial Training is often used as a baseline
defense algorithm.
4.5 ROBUSTNESS EVALUATION TEST
We independently developed a sub-project Perceptron16 to evaluate the robustness of the model.
Perceptron is a robustness benchmark for computer vision DNN models. It supports both image
classification and object detection models as AdvBox, as well as cloud APIs. Perceptron is designed
to be agnostic to the deep learning frameworks the models are built on.
Perceptron provides different attack and evaluation approaches:
• CW(Carlini & Wagner, 2017)
• Gaussian Noise(Hosseini et al., 2017b)
• Uniform Noise(Hosseini et al., 2017b)
• Pepper Noise(Hosseini et al., 2017b)
• Gaussian Blurs(Goodman et al., 2019b; Yuan et al., 2019)
• Brightness(Goodman et al., 2019b; Yuan et al., 2019)
• Rotations(Engstrom et al., 2017)
• Bad Weather(Narasimhan & Nayar, 2000)
5 ATTACK SCENARIO
Compared to previous work(Abadi et al., 2016; Rauber et al., 2017; Nicolae et al., 2018; Ling et al.,
2019), our platform supports more attack scenarios, such as Face Recognition Attack, Stealth T-shirt,
and DeepFake Face Detect.
5.1 SCENARIO 1: FACE RECOGNITION ATTACK
We chose a pre-trained FaceNet(Schroff et al., 2015) model that is a state-of-the-art and widely used
face recognition system as our white box attacked model. We used gradient-based attacks methods
and modify its loss function using FaceNet embedding distance.
As shown in Fig. 1, Fig. (a) and Fig. (b) can be correctly identified, but Fig. (c) is incorrectly
identified.
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(a) Labeled as ”Bill Gates” (b) Labeled as ”Michael Jor-
dan”
(c) Labeled as ”Michael Jor-
dan”
Figure 1: Face Recognition Attack.
(a) (b)
Figure 2: Screenshots to demonstrate our Stealth T-shirt.
5.2 SCENARIO 2: STEALTH T-SHIRT
On Defcon China(Goodman et al., 2019a), we demonstrated T-shirts that can disappear under smart
cameras. We open source the programs and deployment methods of smart cameras for demonstra-
tion. To raise people’s awareness of techniques that can deceive deep learning models, we designed
this ”Stealth T-shirt” with the adversarial pattern to fool an object detector. The T-shirt is capable
of hiding a person who wears it from an open-source object detector. By wearing it and showing
the adversarial pattern in front of a camera and its object detector behind it, the person who wears it
disappears, whereas the person who doesn’t wear the T-shirt is still under object detector detection.
When the smart camera recognizes a human body in the video, it uses a green box to mark the range
of the human body. Assume that the black piece of paper in the Fig. 2 is part of the T-shirt. As
shown in Fig. (a), the black piece of paper covered the gray man, but did not cover the man in red.
The man in red was identified, and the man in gray was not identified. As shown in Fig. (b), the
black piece of paper blocked the man in red, and the man in gray was not covered. The man in gray
was identified, and the man in red was not identified.
(a) Normal (b) Occlusion (c) Turning
Figure 3: Robustness of our Stealth T-shirt.
16https://github.com/advboxes/perceptron-benchmark
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As shown in the Fig. 3, unlike the previous work(Thys et al., 2019; Xu et al., 2019), the picture we
need to print in the T-shirt is smaller, facing the distortion, folding, turning, the attack effect is more
robust.
5.3 SCENARIO 3: DEEPFAKE FACE DETECT
We have opened the DeepFake detection capability for free, and you can remotely call our cloud
detection detection api by using the Python script we provide. Deepfake is a branch of synthetic
media in which a person in an existing image or video is replaced with someone else’s likeness
using artificial neural networks17. Details of our related work can refer to the conference(Wang
et al., 2019c;d).
Figure 4: An example of deepfake technology: actress Amy Adams in the original (left) is modified
to have the face of actor Nicolas Cage (right).
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